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We explore the effect of director social capital, directors with large and influential networks, on 
credit ratings. Using a sample of 11,172 firm-year observations from 1999 to 2011, we find that 
larger board networks are associated with higher credit ratings than both firm financial data and 
probabilities of default predict. Near-investment grade firms improve their forward-looking 
ratings when their board is more connected. Lastly, we find that larger director networks are 
more beneficial during recessions, and times of increased financial uncertainty. Our results are 
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Credit rating agencies (CRAs) attempt to correctly predict default risk and assign 
accurate ratings in the presence of asymmetric information between management and the rating 
agency. One tool that CRAs use to close this information gap is the quality and qualifications of 
top management and the board of directors of the firm they are rating.  For example, Frost (2007) 
shows that CRAs rely on qualitative information when assessing credit ratings. Huang, Chen, 
Hsu, Chen and Wu (2004) show that purely financial empirical models do not fully capture firm 
ratings due to the subjective nature of the rating process. Similarly, Odders-White and Ready 
(2006) show that a rating contains information that is not fully depicted in a firm’s financials.  
For instance, Khatami, Marchica and Mura (2016), find that direct personal connections between 
directors and CRAs result in higher credit ratings than fundamentals suggest.  They reveal that 
CRAs rely on these connections to reduce information asymmetry, resulting in a more favorable 
credit rating.  
We extend Khatami, Marchica and Mura (2016), who focus on direct connections 
between CRAs and directors (direct information channel), by examining the role of each 
director’s overall network (indirect reputation channel or trust channel) in the credit rating 
decision. We argue that this reputation channel also provides important information about the 
quality of the board of directors, based on the size and characteristics of the director’s network. 
Our research builds on the concept of social capital (Putnam, 1995; Rothstein, 2000), or that the 
number and importance of one’s social connections influence the perceived trustworthiness and 
reputation.  Belliveau, O’Reilly and Wade (1996) define social capital as “an individual’s 
personal network.”  Paldam (2000) argues that the “deepest definition of social capital deals with 
trust.” The foundation of that trust is the perceived reputation that everyone will do his or her 
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part, behave well and adhere to a sense of duty. We predict that directors with larger and more 
influential networks have greater social capital. This reduces information asymmetry between the 
CRA and the firm, leading to a higher credit rating.  Lu, Chen, and Liao (2010) find that 
investors demand higher credit spreads under conditions of information asymmetry and 
information uncertainty. Conversely, research supports the concept of connections increasing 
information flow and reducing information asymmetry (Omer, Shelley, and Tice; 2014, Custódio 
and Metzger; 2013, Renneboog and Zhao, 2011 and 2014, Ishii and Xuan, 2014; Cohen, Frazzini 
and Malloy, 2010; and Fracassi, 2008).  
Directors with larger networks are better monitors and advisors due to their information 
and professional advantage (Coles, Wang, and Zhu, 2015). Boards with larger networks have 
been shown to make better decisions regarding CEO replacement and appointment (Coles, 
Wang, and Zhu, 2015), acquisitions (Schonlau and Singh, 2009), and improve firm performance 
(Geletkanycz and Boyd, 2011; Larcker, So, and Wang, 2013). Engelberg, Gao, and Parsons 
(2012) also find that connected boards provide economic value and lower the interest rates 
charged by banks. Chuluun, Prevost, and Puthenpurackal (2014) find that better-connected 
boards lead to lower spreads. Javakhadze, Ferris, and French (2016a) show that greater social 
capital improves financial development by reducing the impediments to external financing.  
Javakhadze, Ferris and French (2016b) find that direct connections between directors, senior 
management, and financiers reduce financial constraints and sensitivity of external financing to 
cash flow. Larger director networks also arise because a director has greater talent, expertise, and 
experience. All of this suggests that connected directors improve monitoring, reduce wasteful 
spending, and conserve cash. This benefits bondholders and improves the credit rating of the 
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firm. Well-connected directors also indirectly certify the quality of the firm. CRAs can 
incorporate this certification when making rating decisions. 
An alternative view, states that larger director networks are associated with lower credit 
ratings. Directors with larger networks are more likely to be busy directors, making them worse 
monitors or advisors (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006). The reason for this is because of time 
constraints, event conflicts, and directors’ effort constraints (Ferris, Jagannathan, and Pritchard, 
2003). For instance, busy boards are associated with poor firm performance (Ahn, Jiraporn, and 
Kim, 2010; Andres, Bongard, and Lehmann, 2013; Fich and Shivdasani, 2006; Jiraporn, Kim, 
and Davidson, 2008). Research also finds that busy boards have low board meeting attendance 
(Jiraporn, Davidson, DaDalt, and Ning, 2009), a greater likelihood of financial statement fraud 
(Beasley, 1996), and weaker corporate governance (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006; Andres, 
Bongard, and Lehmann, 2013). Thus, well-connected boards can reduce monitoring by 
increasing board busyness. This can lead to lower credit ratings assigned by CRAs. 
Our results are more consistent with a reputational and monitoring effect of director 
networks. Using a sample of 11,172 firm-year observations from 1999 to 2011, we find that 
larger board networks are associated with higher credit ratings than predicted by both firm 
financial data and probabilities of default. The effect of director networks is greater in firms just 
below investment rating. Near-investment grade firms improve their forward-looking ratings 
when their board is more connected. Lastly, we find that better connected boards are more 
beneficial during recessions, and times of increased financial uncertainty. Our results are robust 




 We contribute to the literature in several ways. First, we demonstrate that the size and 
relative importance of a board’s network and its social capital, influences credit ratings.  While 
other disciplines explore the concept of social capital, including economics, sociology and 
management (Adler and Kwon, 2002), we are the first to argue that social capital influences 
credit ratings.  
Second, we show that indirect reputation channels also matter in debt contracts. Previous 
literature focuses on only the direct connections between the agents in debt contracts, or the 
direct connection of the agents of entity A to the agents of entity B (the rating firm or financier). 
Karolyi (2013) argues that business relationships form between the agents within two entities, 
not between the entities themselves. Consistent with this view, we show that boards with larger 
and more influential overall networks, over and above, direct ties to rating agencies or financial 
firms, improve credit ratings.1 This is consistent with Larcker, So, and Wang (2013) who take a 
“bird’s eye” view of social capital when they find that well-connected boards outperform less 
central boards when examining risk-adjusted returns. 
2. Background, motivation, and hypothesis development 
2.1 Board Connections, social capital, and credit ratings 
 
                                                 
1 We acknowledge that our measures of board connectivity might also include direct connections to CRAs, the direct 
channel. For example, it is possible that the network includes directors with present or past CRA employment 
experience (CRA director). It is also possible that some directors have connections to CRA directors. This would 
bias our findings. To address this issue we scanned our network of 5.5 million connections to isolate (1) CRA 
directors, and (2) those directors connected to CRA directors.  First, the number of firm-year observations with CRA 
directors is only 2% (225 out of 11172) of our final sample and the number of unique firms with CRA directors is 
3% (49 out of 1652).  Second, the number of firm-year observations with board connections to CRA directors is 
only 2% (160 out of 11172) of our final sample and number of unique firms with board connections to CRA 
directors is 3% (19 out of 1652).  In total, our firm-year sample with CRA directors and directors connected to CRA 
directors is 3.4% (385 out of 11172), and the number of firms with CRA directors and directors connected to CRA 




Prior studies suggest that greater board connections are associated with better credit 
ratings due to the perceived reputation of well-connected directors and the trust built through 
such connections (Khatami, Marchica, and Mura, 2016).  Similarly, directors with larger 
networks are better monitors and advisors due to their information and professional advantages 
(Coles, Wang, and Zhu, 2015).  Prior research also finds that boards with greater connections 
make better decisions regarding CEO replacement and appointment (Coles, Wang, and Zhu, 
2015), acquisitions (Schonlau and Singh, 2009), and have a positive effect on firm value and 
stock performance (Goldman, Rocholl, and So, 2009). Further, Larcker, So, and Wang (2013) 
show that board connections are associated with a higher return on assets and future growth.  
Larger networks can arise because a director has greater talent, expertise, and experience 
which contribute to a higher reputation and greater social capital. Well-connected directors also 
indirectly certify the quality of the firm. CRAs may incorporate this certification when making 
rating decisions. Namely, the final credit rating decision depends on both financial and 
qualitative data.2  The experience of the rater and the history of the firm are just two qualitative 
items that influence a rating decision.  A rating also involves a dialogue between the rating team 
and the firm over time.  Rating agents act as partners in the rating process, providing continued 
feedback to allow the firm to best position its newest debt issuance. Karolyi (2013) finds that 
stronger personal and institutional relationships between parties in a debt contract benefit 
borrowers in the form of higher loan amounts, lower spreads, and fewer covenant restrictions. 
Fogel, Jandik, and McCumber (2014) examine CFO connectivity and the cost of private debt. 
They find that highly connected CFOs result in a 24% (30 bps) reduction in loan spread 
compared to lower connected CFOs. Better-connected boards have also been shown to lead to 
                                                 
2 See http://www.spratings.com/en_US/understanding-ratings for a review of S&Ps rating process.   
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lower spreads (Chuluun, Prevost, and Puthenpurackal, 2014), improved financial development 
(Javakhadze, Ferris, and French, 2016a), and reduced financial constraints and sensitivity of 
external financing to cash flow (Javakhadze, Ferris, and French, 2016b).  
All of this suggests that connected directors improve monitoring, reduce wasteful 
spending, and conserve cash. This benefits bondholders and improves the credit rating of the 
firm. Thus, our first hypothesis predicts that directors with larger and more influential networks 
have greater social capital. This improves board monitoring and reduces information asymmetry 
between the CRA and the firm, leading to a higher credit rating. 
H1:  Larger and more influential board networks are associated with high credit ratings. 
2.2 Board connections, board busyness, and credit ratings 
Alternatively, larger director networks can also be associated with lower credit ratings. 
Directors with larger networks are more likely to be busy directors. Busy directors are worse 
monitors or advisors (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006) because of time constraints, event conflicts, 
and directors’ effort constraints (Ferris, Jagannathan, and Pritchard, 2003). For instance, busy 
boards are associated with poor firm performance (Ahn, Jiraporn, and Kim, 2010; Andres, 
Bongard, and Lehmann, 2013; Fich and Shivdasani, 2006; Jiraporn, Kim, and Davidson, 2008; 
Omer, Shelley, and Tice, 2014). Busier boards also have lower board meeting attendance 
(Jiraporn, Davidson, DaDalt, and Ning, 2009), a greater likelihood of financial statement fraud 
(Beasley, 1996), and weaker corporate governance (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006; Andres, Bongard 
and Lehmann, 2013). This suggests that well-connected boards may actually reduce monitoring 
by increasing board busyness. This can lead to lower credit ratings assigned by CRAs. Thus, our 
alternative hypothesis predicts that well-connected boards are associated with increased board 
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busyness. This reduces board monitoring and increases information asymmetry between the 
CRA and the firm, leading to a lower credit rating.  
H1a:  Larger and influential board networks are associated with lower credit ratings. 
3. Empirical Analysis 
3.1 Test variables – Centralities 
Belliveau, O’Reilly, and Wade (1996) and Putnam (1995) define social capital as a 
person’s social network.  Individuals accrue social capital by developing a large network of 
associations. A network is a figure or pattern of relationships formed by people via associations 
that evolve through their profession, education, recreation, and friends-family.  Each individual 
is assumed to be a participant (node) who forms relationships (edge) with other participants 
creating a network.  One can model or graph the relationships within a social network using the 
collection of nodes and links.  Figure 1 illustrates a simple social network where each circle is 
called a node, characterizing the participant, and the lines are called edges, representing the 
relationships between participants.  Some nodes are more important or powerful because of their 
relative position in the network.  Nodes accrue power in the following manner. First, node A has 
the maximum number of connections in the network.  Second, nodes A, B, C, D, E, and F are 
also important because they are on the shortest path connecting participants in the network.  
Third, nodes A and B are closer to other nodes in the network.  Fourth, nodes I, J, E, D, and H 
are also important by virtue of their association with other important nodes such as nodes A and 
B. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
According to graph theory, the first concept discussed above is degree centrality.  Degree 
centrality measures the number of direct relations by every node and relates to power.  A 
participant with many connections is assumed to be powerful because those connections can lead 
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to valuable information exchange and increased trustworthiness.  The second concept is termed 
as betweenness centrality.  If participants serve as a bridge between others, those participants are 
placed on the shortest distance between them.  For example, node F is on the shortest path 
between node C and G.  Nodes such as F can be privy to more information that they can quickly 
disseminate.  The third concept is closeness centrality.  Consider nodes F and D.  Although both 
lie on the shortest paths between other nodes, node D is closer to other nodes in the network and 
can access more information than node F.  Closeness centrality is the inverse sum of the shortest 
distance between a node and all other nodes in the network.  Accordingly, nodes A and B are 
expected to have high closeness centrality.  Finally, eigenvector centrality measures the 
importance of a node in the network by considering whether a node is connected to another 
highly-connected node.  For example, node H is a loner, but it is important because H is 
connected to node A, who is powerful.  We provide the mathematical formulas to calculate the 
different centralities in Appendix 1.  
The necessary data to construct our network graph comes from Boardex and spans years 
1999 through 2011.  We are interested in the social capital of directors as measured by their 
connectivity.  In our research, we characterize the nodes by directors and the links by the 
relationships they develop.  We create the network of directors using only their professional 
relationships.  We assume the director develops direct relationships with board members in the 
same company.  Directors in one company can also be members of the Board of Directors at 
other companies.  Directors who represent multiple boards are also assumed to develop direct 
connections with board members in the other companies.  For instance, let us assume that there 
are two public companies – company A and company B (see Figure 2).  We create the direct 
connections between each director.  The whole graph with direct and indirect connections (such 
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as between director 2 and director 4) is projected.  Using these projected graphs, we compute the 
four centrality measures using the Stanford Network Analysis Platform (Leskovec and Sosič, 
2016) and Networkit (Staudt and Meyerhenke, 2016) software.  One could argue that multiple 
directorships of directors could be a proxy for social capital. As described in this section, each 
centrality measures captures a different angle of connectivity or social capital. We will 
jeopardize the richness and depth of analysis if we just use multiple directorships as a proxy for 
social capital. We later show the differential effect of each centrality measure on credit ratings.  
Once the centralities have been computed we focus our efforts on US listed firms only.  We 
average the director level centrality measures to obtain the board level centrality measures.  One 
of the drawbacks of the BoardEx database is that it does not provide any standard firm identifier 
such as CUSIP, GVKEY, CIK, or ticker symbol.  Hence, we match firms in BoardEx with 
COMPUSTAT using a name match fuzzy logic algorithm.  We are able to match 6,756 firms 
between BoardEx and COMPUSTAT and obtain 41,855 firm-year observations. We obtain 
credit rating information for 11,172 firm-year observations.  
3.2 Dependent variables and other control variables 
Our dependent variable, Rating, is the variable SPLTICRM from COMPUSTAT.  We 
create an inverse coding system starting with “AAA” rating which we code as 1 and a rating of 
“C” attains a numerical rating of 21(see Appendix 3).  Following the convention in recent credit 
rating papers (Kisgen, 2006; Kisgen and Strahan, 2010; Behr, Kisgen, and Taillard, 2015), firms 
with “D”, “SD” rating, and firms without a rating are dropped from the sample. Firms with a 
“SD” and “D” rating are already in default and could have petitioned for bankruptcy, perhaps 
contaminating our sample.  Our final sample size is 11,172 firm-year observations.   
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We employ control variables as mentioned in Behr, Kisgen, and Taillard (2015) and 
Blume, Lim, and Mackinlay (1998).  Specifically, we employ firm Size, Leverage, Interest 
Coverage, and Operating Margin.  Following Behr Kisgen, and Taillard (2015) and Blume, Lim, 
and Mackinlay (1998), we expect credit ratings to be positively correlated to size, interest 
coverage and operating margin; and negatively correlated to leverage.  In addition to the above-
mentioned control variables, we add additional controls for board and managerial talent. It can be 
argued that our results are picking up some omitted variables associated with boards or 
managerial ability.  Therefore, we introduce several managerial and board-related controls to 
alleviate these concerns.  Specifically, we introduce Board Tenure, Board Age, and Managerial 
Ability. We control for corporate governance by introducing three more variables – Board Size, 
Board Independence, and E-index. Please refer to Appendix 2 for definitions of the variables.  
4. Results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the full sample.  The mean (median) firm in our 
sample has Assets of $8,954 ($3,155) million.  Firms carry 16.67% (6.64%) as cash balances and 
spend, on average, 7.37% (3.61%) of their total assets on capital expenditure.  The mean 
(median) market-to-book ratio is 2.23 (1.80).  So far, the results from the summary statistics of 
the sample suggest that, on average, the firms in our sample are large firms with ample cash 
balances and superior market valuation.  The mean (median) Leverage for firms in our sample is 
67% (66%).  The firms in our sample are highly profitable with an average (median) ROA of 
11.78% (11.27%), and operating margin of 18.26 % (15.25%).   
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
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Panel A of Table 2 presents the univariate statistics for our centrality variables.  The 
centralities are normalized to the entire network; hence, we find extremely small values.  
Normalization allows for comparison of nodes of different sizes (Chuluun, Prevost, and 
Puthenpurackal, 2014; El-Khatib, Fogel, and Jandik, 2015).  Additionally, the board level 
centralities are aggregated from individual director level centralities.  We use the interpretation 
in Fogel, Ma, and Morck (2014) to explain our raw centrality variables. The mean (median) 
betweenness centrality is 0.00012 (0.00007), which means that the average director sits in about 
8,300 paths. A director in the 75th percentile sits in about 7,140 paths. The distributions seem to 
be positively skewed, which is not a surprise because only a limited number of directors reach 
stardom. The mean (median) value for closeness centrality is 0.3135 (0.3146). A closeness 
centrality measure of 0.3153 indicates that a typical director is about (1/0.3153 = 3.71) degrees 
of separation from any randomly chosen director in the network. The mean (median) value for 
degree centrality is 0.00133 (0.00107). Although degree centrality is normalized by the number 
of nodes in the network, a higher value means a larger number of connections. The mean 
(median) value for eigenvector centrality is 0.00160 (0.00080). Eigenvector centrality does not 
provide an intuitive interpretation beyond our description in Appendix 2. A higher value 
certainly means that, on average, the directors are connected with other powerful directors in the 
network.  Panel B presents the pairwise correlations between the centrality variables and ratings.  
Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that the centrality variables are positively correlated with 
ratings meaning that highly connected boards are associated with higher credit ratings.  The 
centrality variables are positively correlated with themselves, suggesting that they measure 
similar, albeit different elements of centrality.   Our results in Table 2 confirm the findings in 
Chuluun, Prevost, and Puthenpurackal (2014).   
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[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Table 3 presents univariate results of our main variable of interest, Rating, which is 
categorized by the four measures of centrality - betweenness centrality, closeness centrality, 
degree centrality, and eigenvector centrality.  The results suggest that while each measure is 
calculated differently and measures different aspects of director centrality, the mean quartile 
scores are very similar across each of the four measures.  For instance, the mean quartile value 
Rating in the lowest quartile for all the centrality measures is approximately 12 (BB rating) and 
for the highest quartile it is 9 (BBB).  These results suggest that a low centrality value for the 
board of directors is associated with noninvestment grade rating.  As centrality increases, the 
noninvestment grade firms transition to investment grade.  This could predict that highly central 
directors help firms just below the investment grade migrate to investment grade.  We find 
additional support for this in Tables 7 and 8, presented later in this paper.  
In Panel E of Table 3, we present the rating summary by industries. We use the Fama-
French 12 industry classification system. The industry with the best overall rating is Utilities, and 
the industry with the lowest overall rating is Telecom. We have a fairly representative set of 
observations into different industries where no one industry comprises more than 17% of the 
total sample. Consumer durables industry contributes lowest to the sample (6%).  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
4.2. Connected boards and credit ratings 
We explore the relation between director and social capital, as measured by director 
centrality, and credit rating. We use a multiple regression model and the following regression 
equation, which includes two-way fixed effects (industry and time) and firm-level clustered 
standard errors:  
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Rating = β (𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦) +𝛽 (𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠) + 𝜀  ,         (1) 
where credit rating is a function of board centrality (betweenness centrality, closeness centrality, 
degree centrality, and eigenvector centrality).  We first control for Size, Leverage, Interest 
Coverage, and Operating Margin.  As noted earlier, credit ratings are coded such that higher 
ratings have a lower number (e.g., AAA = 1 and C = 21).  Since we have an inverted ordinal 
scale, we employ ordered probit for the multiple regression tests.  To create a fluent 
interpretation, we standardize all our test variables (centralities).  The controls variables are 
winsorized at the 5% level and further standardized.  We predict that director connectivity 
measures will be negatively related to our credit rating variable.  
Panel A of Table 4 reports the estimates of Equation (1).  Model 1 includes betweenness, 
and the estimated coefficient is negative and significant at the 0.01 level. Firms with more 
connected directors have higher credit ratings.  This provides support for our hypothesis which 
predicts that more connected directors will be associated with higher credit ratings. A one 
standard deviation increase in betweenness centrality improves the probability of better credit 
rating by 0.1239 units.  Our results are similar using closeness centrality, degree centrality, and 
eigenvector centrality3. A one standard deviation increase in closeness centrality, degree 
centrality, and eigenvector centrality improves the probability of better credit ratings by 0.0747, 
0.1320, and 0.0385 units, respectively.  We perform marginal effects with unstandardized 
regressors. A three-unit increase in betweenness centrality improves credit rating by one full 
notch. One notch improvement in credit rating translates to 39 basis points (Kisgen and Strahan, 
                                                 
3 Our results are robust to the exclusion of financials and utility firms.  
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2010).  Overall, we find that highly connected directors with substantial social capital are 
associated with higher credit ratings4.   
The estimated coefficients on our control variables are also consistent with the 
expectations in Behr, Kisgen, and Taillard (2015). Size is positively associated with credit 
ratings.  A one-standard deviation increase in Size improves the probability of better credit 
ratings by approximately a full notch.  Higher leverage can make it difficult for a firm to pay 
back debt and increase the likelihood of bankruptcy.  In line with this expectation, we find that 
an increase in leverage decreases the probability of credit rating by a quarter notch.  Firms with 
better profitability (Operating Margin) and better capacity to repay debt (Interest Coverage) 
have better credit ratings.  Higher Interest Coverage improves the probability of a better credit 
rating by 0.38 notch.  And, higher Operating Margin improves the probability of a better credit 
ratings by 0.14 notch.  The signs of the control variables are found to be consistent across all of 
our regressions. Therefore, we focus our attention on the test variables going forward.   
4.2.1 Board talent and corporate governance 
Our regression models may suffer from omitted variable bias. Board networks can proxy 
for other measures of board talent and corporate governance. To alleviate this concern, we 
include various board and corporate governance variables in our models. We present these 
results in Panel B of Table 4.  Our results in model 2 and 3 are still robust to the inclusion of 
other proxies for board monitoring and talent. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
4.3 Social capital and default prediction 
                                                 
4 We also used NScore (Larcker, So and Wang, 2013), and the first principal component calculated by performing 
the principal component analysis on the four centrality variables. NScore is computed as the average of the quartile 




A highly connected board benefits a firm in multiple ways such as access to advanced 
information, the expertise from managing different industries, and from the social capital that is 
derived from connections.  Furthermore, connected directors can be seen as more trustworthy 
which could allow CRA agents to look past an alerting ratio.   
We explore whether board connectivity influences the relationship between probability of 
default and credit rating.  To capture default risk probabilities, we use default risk probability 
(DefaultProb) data from Bloomberg. The DRSK model uses the Merton approach to derive the 
distance to default (Cetina and Loudis, 2016; Nirei, Sushko, and Caballero, 2016). A smaller 
value indicates a larger distance to default with a lower default risk probability. Consequently, 
we expect a negative relationship between default probability and credit ratings. We interact 
default probabilities with centralities to see the differential effects of centrality and default risk 
probabilities on credit ratings. Specifically, we run the following model: 
      Rating = β 𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + β 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 + β 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 ∗
𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 +𝛽 (𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠)  + 𝜀           (2) 
The regression results are reported in Table 5. In Panel A of Table 5, we find that 
DefaultProb is negatively related to firm ratings.  A smaller distance to default means higher 
default probability and leads to lower credit ratings. All the board centrality measures are still 
positively related to firm ratings and are statistically significant. The positive association of 
board centrality measures with credit ratings, after controlling for default probability, is 
consistent with the notion that firms with highly connected boards can still achieve better credit 
ratings even with a higher default risk probability. To further explore the effect of default risk 
probabilities, we create terciles of default risk probability – Low, Medium, and High Default 
zones. In Table 5, Panel B, we rerun Equation (2), but without DefaultProb and interaction term. 
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In the distress zone (Models 9 – 12), we find that closeness and degree centralities are positively 
related to credit ratings and are significant at the 5% and 1% level.  In the medium default zone 
(Models 5 – 8), we find that betweenness, closeness, and degree centralities are positively related 
to credit ratings and are significant at the 1% level.  In the safe zone (Models 1 – 4), we show 
that betweenness, and degree centralities are positively related to credit ratings and are 
significant at 1% level. This suggests that the relation between centrality and credit ratings is not 
as strong in the safe zone as in the grey zone. The results in Table 5, Panel B, lend support to our 
hypothesis that social capital alleviates some concerns that financial information may not 
alleviate.  Firms in the grey zone are those most likely to benefit from a highly central board to 
alleviate CRA concerns.  Conversely, firms with very low default probability could have lower 
financial concerns.  Consistent with this view, our results indicate that higher director centralities 
improve credit ratings, and that the relation is strongest for firms with moderately higher default 
probabilities5.  In Table 5, Panel C, we present the results of Equation (3).   
 Rating = 
 
 β 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝐷𝑢𝑚 + β 𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 +β 𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 ∗
𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝐷𝑢𝑚 + 𝛽 (𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠)  +  𝜀                               (3) 
DefaultProbDum is an indicator variable equal to one if the observation falls in the ‘high 
default’ probability zone.  We interact this variable with each of the centrality variables. and as 
expected, we find that firms in the safe zone enjoy higher credit ratings relative to those in the 
distress zone.  Further, we find that coefficients on betweenness and degree centralities remain 
negative and significant meaning that firms with more connected directors have higher credit 
ratings.  The only significant interaction we see is between closeness centrality and the default 
                                                 
5 We tested for the statistical differences between the centrality coefficients in table 5 panel B. Except eigenvector 




probability dummy variable.  Overall, the results in Table 5 support our hypothesis that board 
connectivity improves credit ratings.  This effect is much stronger in firms with moderately 
higher default probabilities suggesting that connected boards can serve to partially alleviate 
concerns of ratings agencies in the presence of a marginal financial picture6.    
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
4.4 Social capital and NBER recessions 
 We show that well-connected boards lead to higher credit ratings. We now explore the 
influence of social capital on credit ratings during NBER recessions by testing the moderating 
effect of recessions on the relation between board connectivity and credit ratings. Karolyi (2013) 
finds the value of personal relationships in lending agreements to be economically larger during 
NBER recessions. Auh (2014) shows that ratings standards are different in times of economic 
expansion versus economic recession.  Specifically, credit ratings are overly pessimistic during 
economic downturns and overly optimistic during economic upturns. This suggests that the 
business cycle materially influences credit ratings. Bolton, Freixia, and Shapiro (2012) show that 
this phenomenon is the result of rating agencies offering higher ratings during economic booms 
to win business, as the risk of default in an expansionary business cycle is likely reduced, and the 
potential for a harmful rating abridged. We predict that the value of social capital derived from 
board connections will be more pronounced during recessions since these are the times of highest 
uncertainty.  We explore the relation between board connectivity and credit rating using a 
multiple regression model using the following regression equation: 
 Rating = β (𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦)
 
+ β (𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛) + β (𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 ∗  𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛) +
𝛽 (𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠) + 𝜀           (4) 
                                                 
6 We performed Table 5 with Altman’s (1968) ZScore and found similar results (available upon request).  
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Regression Equation7 (4) is estimated where Rating is a function of proxies for board 
centrality, an indicator for Recession, an interaction term between director centrality terms and 
recession, and firm level controls. 
Table 6 reports the results of tests for a moderating effect of recessions on the 
relationship between director centrality and credit rating.  Model 1 includes betweenness 
centrality and the interaction term.  The estimated coefficient on betweenness centrality and the 
interaction term shows a positive and significant relationship at the 1% level.  During 
recessionary periods, information asymmetry can also increase making qualitative information 
more valuable.  Taken together, these results suggest that during recessions, the positive effect of 
connected directors on credit rating is stronger, and that highly connected boards improve ratings 
during an economic downturn.  These results align with our theoretical expectations.   Models 2, 
3, and 4 include closeness centrality, degree centrality, and eigenvector centrality, along with 
their interactions with recession.  Our results are robust and statistically significant except for the 
interaction term in Model 4 with eigenvector centrality.  Overall, these results suggest that firms 
which employ boards with more social capital have higher credit ratings during recessions.  
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
4.5 Social capital and investment grade rating 
The importance of investment grade rating has been shown (Kisgen, 2006; Boot, 
Milbourn, and Schmeits, 2006; Partnoy, 1999; Cantor and Packer, 1997).  Boot, Milbourn, and 
Schmeits  highlight pension fund guidelines that often prohibit holding securities below 
investment grade.  Kisgen and Strahan (2010) show that a loss of an investment grade rating 
materially affects the cost of debt and bond prices at the investment grade cut-off, more so than 
                                                 
7 We do not include the time fixed effects in this model because the recession dummy captures a time trend. 
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at other rating levels.  They similarly suggest the effect is due to the loss of institutional investors 
who are constrained by contracts that only allow for investment grade holdings. Alternatively, 
Kemper and Rao (2013) demonstrate that firms do not necessarily place great importance on the 
investment grade rating when making capital structure decisions. In this section, we examine 
whether board connectivity is related to investment grade ratings, examining the difference in 
board composition of firms around this hallowed line. 
The results in Table 5 show that firms in distress benefit from a highly-connected board.  
We further investigate this issue along the investment grade cut-off line.  A shift across this line 
is associated with larger changes in debt costs than at any other rating levels (Kisgen and 
Strahan, 2010).  Therefore, we study the effect of board connectivity on firms that are on the 
edge of investment grade classification.  By adding connected directors, firms just below 
investment grade (BB+, BB, and BB-) can benefit more than those that are financially weaker (< 
BB-).  Therefore, we rerun our analysis using the specification in Table 4 on a subset of firms 
near investment grade and those that are just-above investment grade (BBB+, BBB, and BBB-).   
Table 7 presents the results of our analysis.  Comparing the coefficients for centralities, 
except for eigenvector centrality, Table 7 indicates that board centrality has an effect on firms 
that are just above investment grade; but we are unable to find an effect of centrality on firms 
that are just below investment grade.  This result seems quite puzzling and warrants a further 
investigation given the evidence in Tables 5 and 6.  
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
Therefore, we examine the current year, one-year, and two-year forward-looking Ratings 
of firms that were just below investment grade the previous year.  We split the sample into 
quartiles of centralities.  Panel A of Table 8 presents the results for all firms that were rated 
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below investment grade in the previous year.  Although not monotonic, we generally find that 
the current year, one-year and two-year forward-looking Ratings do improve as we move into 
higher quartiles of centralities.  For instance, we find that for betweenness centrality, the current 
year Rating is between BB- and BB in the lowest quartile.  As we move to the highest quartile of 
betweenness centrality, we find that the current year Rating is between BB and BB+.  We 
witness a similar trend with the one-year and two-year forward-looking Ratings.  It is 
encouraging that within a period of three years, firms with connected directors that were rated 
below investment grade nearly achieve investment grade status, enabling access to institutional 
investors and improving liquidity and returns for bondholders.  In Table 8, Panel A, another 
trend arises when we examine the migration of Ratings along the row (i.e., the time trend for the 
same quartile).  For instance, the Rating in the highest quartile for betweenness centrality 
consistently improves across the time period.  This trend is also consistent among different 
quartiles of betweenness centrality. Except for the first quartiles of the other centrality measures, 
we find that this trend is consistent, which suggests that a highly connected board benefits a firm 
in the form of improved credit ratings.  
In Panel B of Table 8, we examine the Ratings of firms that rose to investment grade that 
were rated as below investment grade in the previous year.  For firms that are in the lowest 
quartile of betweenness centrality, some firms raise their Rating to between A and A-.  For firms 
that are in the second and third quartile of betweenness centrality, we see a rise in Ratings to 
between BBB+ and BBB.  Firms with highly connected boards, as measured by betweenness 
centrality, show an improvement in Ratings to between A- and BBB+.  However, a trend ensues 
when we examine the time trend among different quartiles of centralities.  There is a systematic 
degradation in Ratings moving along time for any quartile of centrality. 
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Next, we present a multiple regression model in Panels C & D of Table 8.  In Panel C, we 
find consistent results for betweenness centrality.  Future ratings improve in firms below 
investment grade in the previous year with more connected boards. In Table 8, Panel D, we 
examine the Ratings of firms that migrate to investment grade from noninvestment grade a year 
earlier.  All the centrality measures are negatively related to credit rating variable.  This suggests 
that highly connected boards are instrumental in helping firms achieve an investment grade 
rating8.  
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
4.6 Endogeneity 
  Firms can hire highly connected directors to improve ratings.  Thus, well-connected 
directors can search for directorships with firms that have better credit ratings.  Therefore, 
director connectivity can be endogenously linked to credit ratings (Hermalin and Weisbach, 
2003).  Our results could be influenced by an omitted variable correlated with our connectivity 
measure that also affects ratings.  We control for the simultaneity bias (reverse causality) and the 
omitted variable bias in multiple ways.  First, as is popular in other studies, we lag the 
independent test variables and estimate Equation (1).  This method is not without caveats 
(Bellemare, Masaki, and Pepinsky, 2015; Reed, 2013). One of the criteria for this method to 
adequately control for simultaneity bias is that the independent variable should be a stationary 
process (i.e., should not display any serial correlation).  We test for the stationary of our board 
centralities using the Fisher’s test in panel data. The test supports that the centrality variables are 
stationary.  We proceed to estimate Model 1 with lagged values of the standardized board 
                                                 
8 In general, we found that board centrality increases only when boards add directors with higher centrality. We 
replicated table 8 panels C & D with board member additions where board centrality increases. Results are 
consistent indicating that firms add board members with higher centrality, which in turn improves future credit 
ratings. Tables are available upon request.  
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centralities and find that the results are unchanged up to two lags.  Models 1 – 4 in Table 9 
present the results of our test with the lagged board centrality variables.  All of the centrality 
variables suggest a positive relationship with credit ratings, confirming that causality runs from 
board connectivity and social capital to ratings.  Second, we use an instrumental variables 
approach.  A Hausman test for the residuals of Model 1 reveals that we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis of exogeneity.  Hence, as in Omer, Shelley, and Tice (2014), we proceed to use 
median industry centralities as our instruments for board centralities.  We use the industry 
median centrality as an instrumental variable because it is expected to be correlated to the 
board’s centrality, but uncorrelated with the error term.  The median centrality of the industry 
could determine the hiring of well-connected directors for firms in the particular industry, but the 
median centrality of the industry should not affect firm credit ratings.  Board size could also 
determine board centralities (Renneboog and Zhao, 2011). In addition to industry median 
centralities we also used the industry median board size as our second instrumental variable. We 
find similar results as with one instrumental variable i.e., industry median centrality.  We present 
the results of the second stage instrumental variable regressions in Models 5 – 8. We find that 
betweenness centrality and eigenvector centrality are still positively related to credit ratings.  All 
our instruments are valid with F-values exceeding the Wald critical values at least at the 10% 
level, suggesting adequate instrument validity.  Third, we perform a correlation test between 
credit ratings and the lagged value of board centralities for those firms whose board size does not 
change from the previous year9.  We find that board centralities remain positively associated 
with credit ratings, supporting our earlier finding that a highly-connected board results in 
                                                 
9 One could argue that board size can remain the same even when board members leave. For example, two new 
directors could replace two departing directors. In this case the board centralities could be different from the 
previous year. We acknowledge this as a potential limitation of this test. 
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improved credit ratings.  In untabulated results, we extend the correlation analysis to a regression 
model, wherein we estimate Equation (1) with lagged standardized board centralities for those 
firms without a change in board composition.  We find that our results are unchanged.  Except 
for eigenvector centrality, all other board centrality variables are positively related to credit 
ratings.  In summary, our robustness tests in this section confirm that endogeneity does not 
influence our results.  
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
5. Conclusion 
Credit ratings continue to be a heavily explored topic in the world of finance.  Credit 
rating assignment is both qualitative and quantitative.  We explore the effect of director social 
capital on firm credit ratings.  We predict that the well-connected boards have greater social 
capital, which will lead to ratings that are more favorable.   
Consistent with this view, we find well-connected boards lead to higher credit ratings.  
Our results are robust to controls for managerial talent and corporate governance. This suggests 
that well-connected boards can ease concerns of CRA agents in marginal firms.  We also 
examine whether well-connected directors lead to ratings that are higher than their default 
probabilities predict. We find that well-connected directors associate with better credit ratings 
than predicted by financial models. Firms with higher default probabilities benefit more from 
connected boards. 
Further, we explore the effect of connected directors on credit ratings during economic 
recessions.  In times of economic downturns, the effect of director connectivity is highly valued.  
We find that firms employing boards with better connections, or greater social capital, have 
higher credit ratings during times of financial distress. Lastly, we examine firms near the 
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investment grade cutoff.  We find that firms with more well-connected boards are more likely to 
migrate above this threshold. The social capital of the board of directors helps influence the 
movement from noninvestment grade to investment grade.  
Taken together, our results suggest that connected directors, those with substantial social 
capital, are a powerful ally in the pursuit of better credit ratings.  To the extent that higher credit 
ratings associate with lower borrowing costs and greater access to financial markets, our findings 
suggest that firms that employ connected directors also benefit from lower borrowing costs and 
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Figure 1 –  
A simple illustration of a social network 
This figure provides a simple illustration of a social network. Alphabets represent nodes or 
participants and the straight lines represent the connections between them.  
 
Company A Company B 
Director 1 Director 4 
Director 2 Director 5 
Director 3 Director 1 
  
Connection Links 
Director 1 Director 2 
Director 1 Director 3 
Director 1 Director 4 
Director 1 Director 5 
Director 2 Director 3 















Figure 2   
Network of directors 

















Summary Statistics - This table presents the summary statistics of the sample. Variables are 
defined in Appendix 2.  
  
 
Variable MEAN MEDIAN STD DEV N 
Rating 10.3070 10.0000 3.4089 11172 
Assets (in millions) 8954.0770 3155.7350 13248.6200 11172 
Tangibility 0.5604 0.2505 0.6888 10664 
Cash 0.1667 0.0664 0.2339 11172 
Capx 0.0737 0.0361 0.0934 11172 
Mkbk 2.2302 1.8025 1.7377 11172 
Leverage 0.6739 0.6623 0.1792 11172 
Roa 0.1178 0.1127 0.0659 10763 




Board network Centrality measures  
This table provides the summary statistics for the centrality measures (non-standardized) for our 
sample. Panel A provides the summary statistics and panel B provides the pair-wise correlation 
tables of our centrality measures and Ratings.  
 
Panel A – Network Measures 
 
Mean SD P25 Median P75 
Between 0.00012 0.00016 0.00004 0.00007 0.00014 
Closeness 0.31353 0.01868 0.30231 0.31464 0.32625 
Degree 0.00133 0.00099 0.00065 0.00107 0.00170 
Eigen 0.00160 0.00274 0.00038 0.00080 0.00173 
      
Panel B – Pairwise Correlation of Centralities and Rating 
 Rating Between Closeness Degree  
Between -0.3291***     
Closeness -0.2827*** 0.5908***    
Degree -0.3417*** 0.8170*** 0.8113***   
Eigen -0.1469*** 0.3416*** 0.4319*** 0.5476***  






Ratings summary –  
This table splits the ratings by quartiles of the four different board centralities – Betweenness, 
Closeness, Degree, and Eigenvector centrality. The quartiles were calculated each year since the 
network is dynamic.  
 
Panel A: Betweenness centrality  
 Mean Median SD N 
Quartile     
1 11.8276 13.0000 3.2712 116 
2 11.2915 12.0000 3.0516 2336 
3 10.7114 11.0000 3.1578 5648 
4 8.7575 9.0000 3.5955 3072 
     
Panel B: Closeness centrality   
1 11.9447 13.0000 2.8701 217 
2 11.2881 12.0000 3.0854 1982 
3 10.7542 11.0000 3.1094 5619 
4 8.8721 9.0000 3.6366 3354 
     
Panel C: Degree centrality   
1 11.7039 12.0000 3.0513 179 
2 11.5061 12.0000 3.0176 2039 
3 10.6791 10.0000 3.0958 5666 
4 8.8461 9.0000 3.6681 3288 
     
Panel D: Eigenvector centrality   
1 11.9087 13.0000 2.9140 241 
2 11.2038 12.0000 3.1031 2174 
3 10.7049 11.0000 3.1341 5700 
4 8.8011 9.0000 3.6483 3057 





Consumer NonDurables BBB 667 
Consumer Durables BB+ 290 
Manufacturing BB+ 1511 
Energy BB 701 
Chemicals BBB- 511 
Business Equipment BB 965 
Telecom B+ 465 
Utilities BBB+ 1044 
Shops BB 1164 
Healthcare BB 522 
Finance BBB 1942 





Ratings and board connectivity – 
Panel A, presents the ordered probit regressions of ratings against standardized centralities and 
other control variables. The dependent variable is Rating. Variables are defined in Appendix 2. 
Panel B, extends the regressions in panel A to present the unified effect of talent and corporate 
governance. Two-way fixed effects with industry and year are employed with firm-level 
clustered standard errors. Control variables are winsorized at the 5% level and then standardized. 
t-statistics in parenthesis.  
 
Panel A: Ordered Probit regressions of Rating versus centralities and control variables 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables Rating Rating Rating Rating 
          
Betweenness -0.1239***    
 (-4.1471)    
Closeness  -0.0747***   
  (-2.8031)   
Degree   -0.1320***  
   (-5.1095)  
Eigen    -0.0385** 
    (-2.1200) 
Size -0.8520*** -0.8692*** -0.8443*** -0.8967*** 
 (-22.0313) (-23.1858) (-22.2581) (-24.3518) 
Leverage 0.2473*** 0.2479*** 0.2502*** 0.2441*** 
 (9.4137) (9.4717) (9.5608) (9.2805) 
Interest Coverage -0.3832*** -0.3834*** -0.3773*** -0.3876*** 
 (-13.3422) (-13.2626) (-13.1256) (-13.4161) 
Operating Margin -0.1382*** -0.1419*** -0.1414*** -0.1361*** 
 (-5.4549) (-5.5501) (-5.5786) (-5.3538) 
     
Observations 11,172 11,172 11,172 11,172 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 





Panel B: Regressions controlling for talent and governance 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables Rating Rating Rating Rating 
         
Betweenness -0.0258    
 (-1.0357)    
Closeness  -0.1081**   
  (-2.0473)   
Degree   -0.0700*  
   (-1.7224)  
Eigen    -0.0022 
    (-0.0762) 
Size -0.8590*** -0.8215*** -0.8319*** -0.8720*** 
 (-13.4955) (-12.0896) (-12.3052) (-13.5243) 
Leverage 0.1617*** 0.1705*** 0.1663*** 0.1595*** 
 (2.7534) (2.8967) (2.8207) (2.7155) 
Interest Coverage -0.3647*** -0.3587*** -0.3608*** -0.3657*** 
 (-8.9800) (-8.9204) (-8.9335) (-8.9661) 
Operating Margin -0.1789*** -0.1826*** -0.1788*** -0.1799*** 
 (-3.7250) (-3.8286) (-3.7405) (-3.7593) 
Managerial Ability -0.0526 -0.0485 -0.0495 -0.0532 
 (-1.5373) (-1.4103) (-1.4469) (-1.5478) 
Board Tenure -0.1538*** -0.1585*** -0.1570*** -0.1538*** 
 (-3.8928) (-4.0062) (-3.9759) (-3.8926) 
Board Age -0.0270 -0.0321 -0.0285 -0.0286 
 (-0.6573) (-0.7809) (-0.6935) (-0.6975) 
Board Size -0.2646*** -0.2619*** -0.2636*** -0.2677*** 
 (-5.6570) (-5.5633) (-5.6381) (-5.6982) 
Board Independence -0.1407*** -0.1158*** -0.1295*** -0.1451*** 
 (-3.9055) (-3.2039) (-3.5993) (-4.0946) 
E-Index -0.0136 -0.0116 -0.0159 -0.0144 
 (-0.3323) (-0.2831) (-0.3873) (-0.3501) 
     
Observations 3,146 3,146 3,146 3,146 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R-squared 0.174 0.174 0.174 0.174 




Table 5 –  
Ratings, board connectivity and probability of default –  
This table presents the combined effect of probability of default and standardized centralities on ratings. Panel A presents the results 
of Equation 2. Panel B presents the sub-sample regressions of Ratings on centralities and other control variables. We split the sample 
into tertiles of Default Probability. DefaultProbDum is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm belongs to the High 
Default Probability category. We interact this dummy variable with board centralities are present the regression results in Panel C. 
Variables are defined in Appendix 2. Two-way fixed effects with industry and year are employed with firm-level clustered standard 
errors. Control variables are winsorized at the 5% level and then standardized. t-statistics in parenthesis.  
Panel A: Regressions of ratings on probability of default  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables Rating Rating Rating Rating 
DefaultProb 13.6741*** 13.7375*** 13.8429*** 13.8690*** 
 (5.1965) (5.3555) (5.0066) (5.2014) 
Between -0.1031***    
 (-2.7320)    
Between*DefaultProb  -1.2180    
 (-0.4326)    
Closeness  -0.1250***   
  (-3.0798)   
Closeness*DefaultProb   -0.8482   
  (-0.3802)   
Degree   -0.1583***  
   (-4.4037)  
Degree*DefaultProb    -0.3231  
   (-0.1069)  
Eigen    -0.0550* 
    (-1.9402) 
Eigen*DefaultProb    0.2456 
    (0.0789) 
Size -0.5833*** -0.5757*** -0.5631*** -0.6154*** 
 (-14.8255) (-14.7413) (-14.4069) (-16.5290) 
Leverage 1.0920*** 1.1038*** 1.1313*** 1.0800*** 
 (4.4291) (4.5322) (4.6273) (4.3862) 
Interest Coverage -0.0500*** -0.0489*** -0.0480*** -0.0499*** 
 (-9.4583) (-9.2438) (-9.1092) (-9.3697) 
Operating Margin -0.9655*** -1.0154*** -0.9770*** -0.9615*** 
 (-3.5465) (-3.6995) (-3.5729) (-3.5287) 
     
Observations 6,122 6,122 6,122 6,122 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 




Panel B: Sub-sample regressions of ratings on centralities by zones of default probabilities 
 
 Low Default Probability Medium Default Probability High Default Probability 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Variables Rating Rating Rating Rating Rating Rating Rating Rating Rating Rating Rating Rating 
                  
Between -0.1393***    -0.1617***    -0.0573    
 (-3.2285)    (-4.3781)    (-1.1890)    
Closeness  -0.0708    -0.1450***    -0.1394**   
  (-1.4494)    (-2.8169)    (-2.1945)   
Degree   -0.1631***    -0.1863***    -0.1236***  
   (-2.9271)    (-4.2966)    (-2.8259)  
Eigen    -0.0215    -0.0634    -0.0219 
    (-0.4541)    (-1.2448)    (-0.6369) 
Size -0.5564*** -0.5784*** -0.5516*** -0.6004*** -0.4983*** -0.5024*** -0.4862*** -0.5472*** -0.6071*** -0.5795*** -0.5775*** -0.6266*** 
 (-11.7630) (-11.8383) (-11.4786) (-13.0841) (-9.2923) (-9.7314) (-9.0459) (-10.7022) (-10.3960) (-9.7164) (-9.9181) (-11.5924) 
Leverage 1.9479*** 1.9298*** 1.9816*** 1.9208*** 0.2905 0.3433 0.3790 0.2635 -0.3196 -0.3338 -0.3247 -0.3066 
 (7.3436) (7.2469) (7.4166) (7.1908) (0.9166) (1.1028) (1.2000) (0.8323) (-0.9023) (-0.9564) (-0.9229) (-0.8651) 
Interest Coverage -0.0367*** -0.0364*** -0.0355*** -0.0369*** -0.0271*** -0.0262*** -0.0254*** -0.0276*** -0.0472*** -0.0459*** -0.0455*** -0.0474*** 
 (-5.4169) (-5.3482) (-5.2334) (-5.3973) (-4.4257) (-4.2091) (-4.1249) (-4.3931) (-7.3963) (-7.0402) (-7.0643) (-7.3493) 
Operating Margin -0.7499* -0.7686* -0.7965* -0.7338* -0.4123 -0.4726 -0.4018 -0.4835 -0.4498 -0.5276 -0.4751 -0.4427 
 (-1.8599) (-1.8706) (-1.9577) (-1.7967) (-1.0871) (-1.2264) (-1.0556) (-1.2586) (-1.2319) (-1.4359) (-1.2938) (-1.2181) 
             
Observations 1,909 1,909 1,909 1,909 2,190 2,190 2,190 2,190 2,023 2,023 2,023 2,023 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R-squared 0.155 0.152 0.155 0.152 0.143 0.141 0.143 0.139 0.133 0.134 0.135 0.132 
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Panel C: Regressions of ratings on probability of default – distress zone vs. safe zone 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables Rating Rating Rating Rating 
          
DefaultProbDum 0.6707*** 0.6486*** 0.6522*** 0.6622*** 
 (-9.9447) (-9.5757) (-9.6094) (-9.7967) 
Between -0.1432***    
 (-4.6802)    
Between *DefaultProbDum   0.0670    
 (1.4433)    
Closeness  -0.0416   
  (-1.4151)   
Closeness  *DefaultProbDum   -0.0949*   
  (-1.8207)   
Degree   -0.1042***  
   (-3.3270)  
Degree * DefaultProbDum   -0.0201  
   (-0.4322)  
Eigen    -0.0160 
    (-0.7975) 
Eigen * DefaultProbDum    -0.0278 
    (-0.8187) 
Size -0.5998*** -0.6126*** -0.6002*** -0.6311*** 
 (-21.2744) (-22.2194) (-21.6222) (-23.3555) 
Leverage 1.2356*** 1.2316*** 1.2395*** 1.2187*** 
 (8.6774) (8.6709) (8.7023) (8.5581) 
Interest Coverage -0.0512*** -0.0505*** -0.0504*** -0.0515*** 
 (-12.7815) (-12.4928) (-12.5395) (-12.8250) 
Operating Margin -0.9565*** -0.9519*** -0.9610*** -0.9134*** 
 (-4.9054) (-4.8136) (-4.9084) (-4.6734) 
     
Observations 8,982 8,982 8,982 8,982 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R-squared 0.193 0.192 0.193 0.192 





Ratings and board connectivity during recessions –  
This table presents the combined effect of recessions and standardized centralities on Ratings. 
Variables are defined in Appendix 2. We interact the recession indicator variable with 
centralities. Industry fixed effects with firm-level clustered standard errors are employed. 
Control variables are winsorized at the 5% level and then standardized. t-statistics in parenthesis.  
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables Rating Rating Rating Rating 
Recession 0.0015 0.0100 0.0017 0.0057 
 (0.1053) (0.7006) (0.1212) (0.4000) 
Between -0.1620***    
 (-4.1696)    
Recbetw  -0.0505***    
 (-3.1261)    
Closeness  0.0191   
  (0.7866)   
Recclos   -0.0291**   
  (-2.0260)   
Degree   -0.1473***  
   (-5.9538)  
Recdegr    -0.0466***  
   (-3.0597)  
Eigen    -0.0404** 
    (-2.2099) 
Receige     -0.0127 
    (-0.5822) 
Size -0.7376*** -0.8102*** -0.7356*** -0.7962*** 
 (-20.4637) (-23.0561) (-21.2553) (-23.6530) 
Leverage 0.2220*** 0.2159*** 0.2241*** 0.2160*** 
 (8.7614) (8.5280) (8.8865) (8.5423) 
Interest Coverage -0.3237*** -0.3328*** -0.3158*** -0.3273*** 
 (-11.6937) (-11.7485) (-11.4049) (-11.7053) 
Operating Margin -0.1329*** -0.1268*** -0.1357*** -0.1293*** 
 (-5.4297) (-5.1402) (-5.5543) (-5.2746) 
     
Observations 11,172 11,172 11,172 11,172 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R-squared 0.154 0.150 0.153 0.150 
 





Ratings, board connectivity, just below investment grade (BB), and just-above investment 
grade (BBB)  
This table replicates the regression results in Table 4 for firms that have a credit rating of BBB+, 
BBB, and BBB- (just above investment grade), and BB+, BB, and BB- (just below investment 
grade). The dependent variable is Ratings. Variables are defined in Appendix 2. Two-way fixed 
effects with industry and year are employed with firm-level clustered standard errors. 
Centralities are standardized. Control variables are winsorized at the 5% level and then 
standardized. t-statistics in parenthesis.  
 
 Just - Above investment grade Just – Below Investment Grade 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables Rating Rating Rating Rating Rating Rating Rating Rating  
        
Between -0.1084***    -0.1186    
 
(-2.9818)    (-1.4387)    
Closeness  -0.1488***    -0.0431   
 
 (-2.9612)    (-0.8984)   
Degree   -0.1343***    -0.0778  
 
  (-3.0057)    (-1.3333)  
Eigen    -0.0037    -0.0346 
 
   (-0.1000)    (-0.9569) 
Size -0.2972*** -0.2794*** -0.2862*** -0.3405*** -0.6598*** -0.6741*** -0.6686*** -0.6857*** 
 
(-5.1232) (-4.7722) (-4.8636) (-6.0069) (-10.4871) (-10.5434) (-10.6069) (-11.1121) 
Leverage 0.0166 0.0138 0.0185 0.0188 0.2064*** 0.2060*** 0.2069*** 0.2022*** 
 
(0.2971) (0.2487) (0.3309) (0.3349) (4.1274) (4.1307) (4.1507) (4.0315) 
Interest Coverage -0.1181*** -0.1102*** -0.1138*** -0.1173*** -0.1444*** -0.1446*** -0.1438*** -0.1483*** 
 
(-2.7389) (-2.5842) (-2.6499) (-2.7179) (-2.7720) (-2.7722) (-2.7523) (-2.8399) 
Operating Margin -0.1140*** -0.1268*** -0.1206*** -0.1069** -0.0101 -0.0092 -0.0095 -0.0050 
 
(-2.6536) (-2.9493) (-2.7745) (-2.4920) (-0.2051) (-0.1865) (-0.1936) (-0.1024) 
         
Observations 3,558 3,558 3,558 3,558 2,850 2,850 2,850 2,850 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0488 0.0495 0.0494 0.0450 0.0956 0.0946 0.0951 0.0946 






Forward-looking ratings if below investment grade  
Panel A presents the current period rating (Rating), one-year (F1 Rating) and two-year (F2 Rating) forward looking ratings for firms 
that were below investment grade. Panel B presents the current period rating (Rating), one-year (F1 Rating) and two-year (F2 Rating) 
forward looking ratings for firms that were below investment grade but migrated to investment grade. Panel C (panel D), presents the 
results in panel A (panel B) using a regression model. The dependent variable is Ratings. Variables are defined in Appendix 2. Two-
way fixed effects with industry and year are employed with firm-level clustered standard errors. Centralities are standardized. Control 
variables are winsorized at the 5% level and then standardized. t-statistics in parenthesis. 
 
Panel A: Average of current year rating, one-year, and two-year forward-looking ratings for firms just below investment grade in the 
previous year 
  Between Closeness Degree Eigen 
Quartiles Rating F1 Rating F2 Rating Rating F1 Rating F2 Rating Rating F1 Rating F2 Rating Rating F1 Rating F2 Rating 
1 12.6768 12.6027 12.5000 12.7778 12.9366 12.9683 12.5828 12.7798 12.8936 12.7857 12.9484 12.9407 
2 12.9559 12.8721 12.8044 12.9269 12.8627 12.7566 13.0080 12.9126 12.8127 12.9012 12.8408 12.7495 
3 12.6392 12.5041 12.3503 12.6689 12.5193 12.3883 12.5998 12.4612 12.3270 12.6499 12.4902 12.3577 
4 11.7332 11.6265 11.4253 11.8339 11.7302 11.5156 11.8911 11.7854 11.5627 11.7940 11.6843 11.4412 
 
Panel B: Average of current year rating, one-year, and two-year forward-looking ratings for firms just below investment grade in the 
previous year that migrated into investment grade 
  Between Closeness Degree Eigen 
Quartiles Rating F1 Rating F2 Rating Rating F1 Rating F2 Rating Rating F1 Rating F2 Rating Rating F1 Rating F2 Rating 
1 6.4286 6.4286 6.5714 8.4615 8.6923 8.8333 7.1429 7.1429 7.3333 8.4286 8.6429 8.7692 
2 8.4295 8.3526 8.5946 8.2077 8.1846 8.3760 8.4088 8.3942 8.6250 8.2245 8.1769 8.3786 
3 8.2429 8.1286 8.3196 8.3310 8.2075 8.4322 8.2769 8.1648 8.3589 8.3515 8.2313 8.4119 





Panel C: Regressions of current year rating, one-year and two-year forward-looking ratings for firms below investment grade in the 
previous year 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Variables Rating Rating Rating Rating F1 Rating F1 Rating F1 Rating F1 Rating F2 Rating F2 Rating F2 Rating F2 Rating 
Between -0.0877***    -0.1107***    -0.1238***     
(-2.5955)    (-3.0746)    (-3.2279)    
Closeness  0.0172    0.0148    -0.0122    
 (0.6724)    (0.5034)    (-0.3883)   
Degree   -0.0345    -0.0455    -0.0673**   
  (-1.1669)    (-1.3999)    (-1.9713)  
Eigen    -0.0069    -0.0060    -0.0163  
   (-0.3525)    (-0.2704)    (-0.7198) 
Size -0.7248*** -0.7549*** -0.7384*** -0.7477*** -0.7199*** -0.7570*** -0.7375*** -0.7505*** -0.6473*** -0.6797*** -0.6632*** -0.6823***  
(-17.4338) (-17.9963) (-17.7931) (-18.4310) (-15.3977) (-15.9406) (-15.8115) (-16.5685) (-13.2130) (-13.7458) (-13.6033) (-14.5350) 
Leverage 0.2814*** 0.2787*** 0.2810*** 0.2796*** 0.3098*** 0.3065*** 0.3092*** 0.3073*** 0.2568*** 0.2540*** 0.2567*** 0.2533***  
(11.8531) (11.7743) (11.8496) (11.7779) (11.3286) (11.2201) (11.3159) (11.2362) (8.8498) (8.7662) (8.8542) (8.7248) 
Interest Coverage -0.3262*** -0.3343*** -0.3290*** -0.3320*** -0.4448*** -0.4550*** -0.4485*** -0.4528*** -0.5214*** -0.5297*** -0.5241*** -0.5294***  
(-9.7026) (-9.9772) (-9.8017) (-9.8924) (-10.5039) (-10.7773) (-10.6236) (-10.7138) (-10.8427) (-11.0235) (-10.9159) (-11.0108) 
Operating Margin -0.1511*** -0.1455*** -0.1493*** -0.1473*** -0.2033*** -0.1971*** -0.2010*** -0.1985*** -0.2348*** -0.2309*** -0.2338*** -0.2305***  
(-5.2978) (-5.0841) (-5.2344) (-5.1580) (-6.1510) (-5.9426) (-6.0863) (-6.0041) (-6.5192) (-6.3766) (-6.4947) (-6.3808) 
             
Observations 5,936 5,936 5,936 5,936 4,808 4,808 4,808 4,808 4,001 4,001 4,001 4,001 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 





Panel D: Regressions of current year rating, one-year and two-year forward-looking ratings for firms just below investment grade 
that migrated into investment grade 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Variables Rating Rating Rating Rating F1 Rating F1 Rating F1 Rating F1 Rating F2 Rating F2 Rating F2 Rating F2 Rating  
            
Between -0.1446***    -0.1532***    -0.1459***    
 
(-4.4683)    (-4.3757)    (-3.5065)    
Closeness  -0.0982**    -0.1133**    -0.1361***   
 
 (-2.3176)    (-2.4565)    (-2.7298)   
Degree   -0.1510***    -0.1402***    -0.1517***  
 
  (-4.2928)    (-3.6447)    (-3.6980)  
Eigen    -0.0601**    -0.0505*    -0.0597* 
 
   (-2.1027)    (-1.7180)    (-1.8812) 
Size -0.4862*** -0.5089*** -0.4848*** -0.5393*** -0.5305*** -0.5503*** -0.5369*** -0.5912*** -0.4804*** -0.4846*** -0.4769*** -0.5346*** 
 
(-8.4046) (-8.8883) (-8.4795) (-9.7821) (-8.6712) (-8.9774) (-8.8159) (-10.0880) (-7.4199) (-7.4028) (-7.4004) (-8.5588) 
Leverage 0.1196** 0.1214** 0.1163** 0.1167** 0.1184** 0.1192** 0.1149** 0.1155** 0.1165** 0.1148** 0.1112* 0.1087* 
 
(2.3854) (2.4219) (2.3250) (2.2959) (2.2464) (2.2401) (2.1657) (2.1409) (2.0466) (2.0010) (1.9407) (1.8660) 
Interest Coverage -0.3296*** -0.3362*** -0.3252*** -0.3369*** -0.4122*** -0.4180*** -0.4098*** -0.4227*** -0.4122*** -0.4170*** -0.4083*** -0.4224*** 
 
(-6.9606) (-7.0407) (-6.8536) (-6.9680) (-9.0034) (-9.0386) (-8.8804) (-9.0659) (-7.9940) (-8.0248) (-7.8624) (-8.0355) 
Operating Margin -0.1803*** -0.1815*** -0.1838*** -0.1751*** -0.2219*** -0.2246*** -0.2242*** -0.2166*** -0.2728*** -0.2833*** -0.2807*** -0.2714*** 
 
(-4.1973) (-4.2563) (-4.2801) (-4.0874) (-5.0599) (-5.1105) (-5.0849) (-4.9394) (-5.5034) (-5.6955) (-5.6283) (-5.4316) 
             
Observations 859 859 859 859 859 859 859 859 788 788 788 788 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R-squared 0.138 0.135 0.138 0.134 0.159 0.155 0.157 0.153 0.153 0.151 0.153 0.149 




Ratings and board connectivity – endogeneity –  
This table presents the regression results of ratings against lagged centralities and the second stage regression of the instrumental 
variables regression. Variables are defined in Appendix 2. The dependent variable is Ratings. Two-way fixed effects with industry and 
year are employed with firm-level clustered standard errors. Centralities are standardized. Control variables are winsorized at the 5% 
level and then standardized. t-statistics in parenthesis.  
  
 Lagged centralities Second-stage instrumental variable regression 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables Rating Rating Rating Rating Rating Rating Rating Rating  
        
Between -0.1183***    -1.6936***    
 
(-3.9361)    (-2.8982)    
Closeness  -0.0784***    0.0722   
 
 (-2.7132)    (0.1664)   
Degree   -0.1338***    -0.6517  
 
  (-4.8900)    (-1.5698)  
Eigen    -0.0404**    -1.4760** 
 
   (-2.1281)    (-2.3004) 
Size -0.8490*** -0.8633*** -0.8386*** -0.8932*** -1.1906*** -1.9986*** -1.6455*** -1.6802*** 
 
(-20.5423) (-21.3659) (-20.6170) (-22.7016) (-4.4380) (-9.4767) (-8.0377) (-13.2488) 
Leverage 0.2494*** 0.2502*** 0.2534*** 0.2454*** 0.5226*** 0.4675*** 0.5052*** 0.4659*** 
 
(8.5348) (8.5916) (8.6982) (8.3844) (16.1655) (13.7672) (15.5186) (16.5771) 
Interest Coverage -0.3741*** -0.3733*** -0.3675*** -0.3780*** -0.7165*** -0.8829*** -0.7872*** -0.7235*** 
 
(-12.3680) (-12.2423) (-12.1318) (-12.4131) (-11.4610) (-15.1388) (-12.8434) (-10.0501) 
Operating Margin -0.1381*** -0.1426*** -0.1417*** -0.1363*** -0.2991*** -0.2596*** -0.2935*** -0.3073*** 
 
(-5.0048) (-5.1038) (-5.1236) (-4.9225) (-10.2573) (-5.5872) (-9.7732) (-9.0636) 
Constant     8.9586*** 8.2767*** 8.3948*** 8.2997*** 
     (32.8307) (49.3981) (61.0566) (69.8351) 
Observations 9,399 9,399 9,399 9,399 11,172 11,172 11,172 11,172 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R-squared 0.169 0.168 0.169 0.167     
Adj. R-Squared     0.4691 0.5913 0.5923 0.4441 




Degree Centrality - A director can be highly connected if he is a member of multiple boards that 
provides many relationships and conduits of information transfer resulting in value enhancing 
opportunities and increased trustworthiness. In simple terms, degree centrality is the total 
number of connections possessed by a director. Degree centrality is measured as follows. Let Aij 
denote a matrix containing a value of 1 if directors i and j are connected and 0 otherwise. Let CD 
(i) denote the number of nearest neighbors to director I,  
j







  , where n is the number of directors in the network.  
Closeness Centrality - a director can be highly connected if she maintains shorter and closer ties 
to other boards making information exchange faster. The concept of closeness refers to the 
‘number of hoops’ a director has to jump before she gets to another director with important 
information for her firm. Let d(i, j) denote the shortest number of steps that connect director i to 
director j in the network. From director i's perspective, the value 
j
jid ),( denotes the total 
number of (shortest) steps taken to connect with all other directors in the network. The measure 








  and 
measures closeness centrality, where values indicate how closely tied director i is to other 
directors in the network. The scaled measure is )()1(),(* iCnjiC CC  . 
Betweenness Centrality - a director can be highly-connected if he occupies key positions on 
paths between other boards, making him a key agent of information transfer. In those instances, a 
director attains the unique position to serve as a bridge between two distinct network groups of 
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directors. In this context, a director serves as a resource that facilitates making contacts. An 
example of such a director would be a person from a financial institution who serves on boards 
of an industrial firm. The director belongs to both clusters but may not possess the specialized 
industrial knowledge to be closely connected with the other firms within a cluster. Let dst(i) 
denote the number of shortest paths between directors s and t with director i being an 
intermediate connection and let dst (i) denote the total number of shortest links that connect 
















 .  
Eigenvector Centrality – this is derived from degree centrality, which distinguishes that more 
direct connections is influential when those connection directors are also influential with respect 
to their centralities. Further, there can be instances when a director may not be well-connected 
with other directors, but can have a connection with other directors who are very influential by 
virtue of their position in the network. Such a less than well-connected director benefits from her 
contacts. Let vi denote the importance of director i. The value of vi depends on the value of vj for 
director j if director i is connected to director j. If we consider all directors in the network, vi is 
determined by 
j
jijvA  . To compute vi, suppose we assign a value of 1 to each director’s 
importance and recursively determine vi, by the following relation 
j
jiji vAv )(  , the values 






. In matrix notation, this is written as Av =  v. The constant   is easily 
seen as an eigenvalue measure. The eigenvector associated with the largest eigenvalue indicates 
the measure of each director’s importance in the network.  
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The data to calculate these director level centralities is obtained from BoardEx. Using this 
database, we create the network of directors for every year. We assume that connections formed 
once continue to exist even when the director is no longer connected with his counterparty 
through employment. Hence, our network grows exponentially over the years to reach 29 million 
connections by the year 2011. Although our data starts in 1999 and ends in 2011, the lack of data 
before 1999 does not affect the centrality calculation because we realize that the graph describing 
the universe of connections for all directors is dynamic and keeps evolving every year as those 
directors acquire new connections. We calculate the centralities every year, thereby avoiding any 
dependencies on the formation of the initial network of connections. BoardEx provides data on 
US and non-US directors. We built the network graph for US and non-US directors employed by 
US firms. This network graph is more inclusive and exponentially larger, but it provides 




Appendix 2 - Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
Assets Total assets (in millions $) 
Between The standardized value of betweenness centrality calculated 
per Appendix 1. 
Board Age Average age of the board of directors 
Board Independence Percentage of independent directors on the board 
Board Size Total number of members on the board of directors 
Board Tenure Average tenure of the board of directors 
Capx Capital expenditures scaled by total sales 
Cash Cash and equivalents scaled by total assets 
Closeness The standardized value of closeness centrality calculated per 
Appendix 1. 
Degree The standardized value of degree centrality calculated per 
Appendix 1. 
Eigen The standardized value of eigenvector centrality calculated 
per Appendix 1. 
E-Index Entrenchment index per Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) 
Interest Coverage Ratio of the sum of earnings before interest and tax, and 
interest expenses to interest expenses 
Leverage Total liabilities scaled by total assets 
Managerial Ability Managerial ability index per Demerjian, Lev, and McVay 
(2012) 
Mkbk Ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity 
Operating Margin Earnings before interest tax, depreciation, and amortization 
to sales 
Rating Derived from the Ratings provided by COMPUSTAT. An 
inverse coding system starting with “AAA” rating which is 
code as 1 and a rating of “C” is coded 21. Firms with “D,” 
“SD” rating and no rating are dropped.     
Recession Dummy variable that takes value of 1 for recession years per 
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) 
Recbetw The interaction of Recession and Between 
Recclos The interaction of Recession and Closeness 
Recdegr The interaction of Recession and Degree 
Receige The interaction of Recession and Eigen 
Roa Ratio of earnings before interest tax, depreciation, and 
amortization to total assets 
Size Log of total assets 
Tangibility Net property, plant and equipment scaled by total sales 
Default Probability Distance to Default obtained from Bloomberg 
DefProbDum Dummy variable that takes value of 1 if a firm belongs to the 




Appendix 3 - Rating Mnemonic 
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